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Introduction
The impact of free trade, and more generally global-
ization, is a ready source of public debate, and the
reach of that debate is broadening. When the impact
of increasing foreign competition was felt mainly by
the manufacturing sector (call this “stage one” of the
free trade/globalization debate), the view of many, if
not most, economists was strikingly uniform: Trade
generates large net benefits to national economies.
The gains accrue to consumers from lower prices and
to the overall economy in efficiency, leading to high-
er aggregate welfare. Within the economics profes-
sion, there is similar, if less visible, agreement that
liberalized trade reduces incomes to some producers
and workers. With (large) net benefits, a common
professional view of the question of “free trade” is a
distributional one—that the distribution of the bene-
fits from free trade, across industries, occupations,
regions, and ultimately individuals, is uneven.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the economists’ view
does not resonate well with many Americans. Opinion
surveys show that when asked a question mentioning
both benefits and costs to trade, a majority of respon-
dents chose the answer emphasizing the costs over the
benefits (see chapter two in Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).
It seems fair to conclude that many Americans have
their doubts about the value of free trade, particularly
when the costs are known to be borne by workers.
This dissonance of views arises from the nature
of the economists’ “It’s a distributional issue” perspec-
tive. Economic theory suggests that not everyone ben-
efits from free trade: Positive economy-wide benefits
result from the gains of the “winners” exceeding the
losses of the “losers.” Clearly, some of the most con-
tentious issues regarding free trade concern the size of
the costs associated with moving workers from im-
port-competing sectors to other parts of the economy.
The highly visible nature of job loss, and the failure
of current federal adjustment programs to compensate
workers for their losses, clearly weakens popular sup-
port for the view that economic integration brings wide-
spread benefits.
While perhaps overly simple, the characterization
above captures much of the “free trade and jobs” de-
bate, up to 2002.1 That year saw the emergence of
“services outsourcing,” which I call “stage two” of
the debate over globalization and the American labor
market. Global outsourcing of services (or offshoring)
is the services version of the globalized production that
has become (almost) commonplace in manufacturing.
With services outsourcing (potentially) broadening
job loss to higher-skill (white-collar) workers and with
its implicit challenge to presumed American compar-
ative advantages, these activities appear to raise some
new concerns, different from the ones voiced in the past.
Whether different or the same, the arrival of ser-
vices outsourcing virtually guarantees that internation-
al trade and globalization will remain an important focus
of public attention to job loss. The reverse will also
likely continue to be true: Pervasive concerns about
the incidence and consequences of job loss will remain
an important part of discussions about globalization.
In this article, I report on recent research on the nature
and extent of manufacturing job loss related to trade.
Investigations of services outsourcing are in their infan-
cy, and my discussion reflects that thin knowledge base.
My discussion here is framed by the perspective
that understanding the labor market costs of global39 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
trade is a requirement for moving forward equitably
on the path of international economic integration. To
understand how the principle of national net benefits
from free trade can be translated into programs that
compensate workers, it is necessary to identify who
bears the burden of costs and to measure the size of
that burden. In Kletzer (2001, 2002b), I report on re-
cent research measuring the extent and nature of job
loss related to imports; and in Kletzer (2002a), I sum-
marize that research, with a particular focus on job
losses associated with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
In what follows, I summarize what is currently
known about the magnitude of job loss related to im-
port competition. Current research suggests that high
import-competing industries accounted for about 40
percent of manufacturing job losses from 1979 to 2001.
I describe the earnings losses associated with trade-
related job loss. I also discuss the little that is currently
known about services outsourcing. I conclude with a
brief discussion of policies aimed at ameliorating the
impact of import-related job loss on workers. Although
job displacement due to services outsourcing is likely
a small part of economy-wide job displacement, it is
likely to grow in importance in the future. With this
growth will likely come pressure to change or expand
worker adjustment programs.
What we know about trade and job loss:
Evidence from manufacturing2
Trade displacement is a notion that exists in public
discourse, in large part due to the Trade Adjustment
Assistance Act (TAA), first passed by Congress in
1962. With 40-plus years of usage, trade-related job
loss is commonly understood to mean job loss due to
increasing imports, and a trade-displaced worker is a
worker for whom increased imports have contributed
to job loss. This definition faces a number of compli-
cations, including the obvious: We have no way of
knowing for certain whether a given worker is trade
displaced, nor do we have any widely agreed-upon
ways of identifying the share of workers in a given
industry who are trade displaced. Within academic
circles, there is the additional empirical challenge of
capturing the causal nature of the “trade and employ-
ment change” question (see Kletzer, 2002b, for details).
My research takes as its starting point that there is a
common notion of trade displacement in public dis-
course. I have sought to define the term in a way that
is grounded in economic analysis. My goal has long
been to identify workers whose job loss is associated
with rising imports. I am not claiming to prove that
trade or imports are the cause of the job loss.3
The notion of an import-competing industry can
be made operational by considering changes (specifi-
cally increases) in import share (also called import
penetration rate). Import share is calculated by dividing
industry imports by the sum of industry output plus
imports (thus the denominator is industry supply). As
noted in Kletzer (2002b), changes in import share can
be conceptually related to changes in employment
and job loss (through changes in product demand).4
Industries with rising import shares are where we
might expect to see a relationship between the flow
of imports and declining domestic employment and
job loss. In Kletzer (2001), I defined a set of highly
“import-competing” industries as those industries in
the top 25 percent of a ranking of industries by their
percentage change in import share over the 1979–94
period (from largest positive to smallest). Industries
in this top quartile, those with the largest percentage
increases in import share, include most of the ones
we would call traditional import-competing indus-
tries: electrical machinery, radio and television, ap-
parel, motor vehicles, footwear, blast furnaces, knitting
mills, and toys and sporting goods. This industry def-
inition, applied to the worker-based Displaced Worker
Surveys (DWS),5 yielded a sample of highly import-com-
peting displaced workers, based on a worker’s indus-
try of displacement.
Table 1 lists the high import-competing (or im-
port-sensitive) industries, as defined in Kletzer (2001),
with updated trade information for the period 1979–
96.6 These industries are the most likely to produce
import-competing job losses, and we can usefully
consider workers displaced from these industries to
be import-competing displaced workers. Industries
are listed in table 1 in order of estimated total number
of workers displaced during the period 1979–2001
from largest to smallest.7 High import-competition in-
dustries vary from low-wage (apparel, footwear, knitting
mills, leather products) to high-wage sectors (com-
puters, blast furnaces, tires and inner tubes, construc-
tion and material moving machines, motor vehicles).8
Along with the number of workers displaced, ta-
ble 1 reports each industry’s share of manufacturing
displaced. The large employment industries, such as
electrical machinery, apparel, transportation equipment,
and non-electrical machinery, accounted for about 30
percent of manufacturing displacement. The risk of
job loss in an industry is roughly captured by the job
loss rate (calculated on a yearly basis as the ratio of
the number of workers displaced to average industry
employment). That rate is reported in table 1 as an
average across the years 1979–2001. As discussed in
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rising import share is somewhat complex: Some indus-
tries with high rates of job loss had large increases in
import share (leather and leather products, pottery
and related products), but within and across industries,
the relationship between rising import share and job
loss risk is fairly weak.
I report changes in import share for 1979–96,
1979–85, and 1985–96. The appreciation of the ex-
change value of the dollar from 1981 to 1985 was
particularly important for American manufacturing.
The strong dollar made U.S. exports more expensive
to buy and made imports cheaper. Recovery from the
1981–82 recession fueled U.S. demand for foreign
imports, while  the more sluggish recovery of U.S.
trading partners dampened demand for U.S. exports.
The exchange value of the dollar peaked in 1985 (with
the September 1985 Plaza Accord), and the dollar de-
preciated about 30 percent from 1986 to 1989. Thus,
it is appropriate to consider a pre-1985 period and a
post-1985 period.9
One additional point about “trade” is that the dis-
cussion here follows a tradition of focusing on imports
when examining the costs of trade. Trade, of course,
includes both imports and exports, and many indus-
tries, including the high import-competing ones high-
lighted here, do both. The simple view of trade, that
the U.S. imports watches and apparel and exports air-
planes and construction equipment, is not only sim-
ple, it is wrong. A more realistic view is that the U.S.
exports and imports all or parts of all these goods, ei-
ther as intermediates or as final goods. Before moving
on, it is important to note that the “importers” noted
here are also exporters. Electrical machinery and equip-
ment, motor vehicles, and electronic computing equip-
ment count among the top exporters, as well as being
importers.
This notion of within-industry, two-way trade,
has an extensive literature.10 As I report in more detail
in Kletzer (2001), a simple variation of the trade over-
lap index of Grubel and Lloyd (1975) provides some
insight on an industry’s level of engagement in world
trade. This measure is reported in the last column of
table 1. Balanced industries are those with a high de-
gree of trade overlap (both imports and exports), where
the flows of exports and imports are equal (or nearly
so). Unbalanced industries are those where one of the
flows dominates the other in size.
As seen in table 1, 23 of the 27 three-digit indus-
tries listed are importers, with 14 unbalanced importers.
The industries we most strongly associate with import
competition are also unbalanced importers (apparel,
motor vehicles, blast furnaces, footwear, knitting mills).
Among the balanced importers (electrical machinery,
cycles and miscellaneous transport, office and account-
ing machines, photographic equipment), some of the
textile industries are particularly notable. In terms of
job loss, these industries can be vulnerable to both
rising imports and declining exports. As I report in
Kletzer (2002b), the focus on import competition and
jobs underplays the link between exports and jobs.
Export growth is associated with employment growth,
and as sales increase due to exports, the risk of job
loss falls.
Using a somewhat conservative count of displaced
workers, I estimate that 18.6 million workers lost jobs
in all of U.S. manufacturing during the period 1979–
2001, about 37 percent of the total U.S. nonagricultural
job loss of 49.8 million.11 During this period, manufac-
turing represented, typically, just under 18 percent of
total nonagricultural employment. The high import-com-
peting group accounted for about 40 percent of manu-
facturing displacement, at 7.45 million workers. During
the 1979–2001 period, these industries accounted for
just under 30 percent of manufacturing employment.
In Kletzer (2002a), I reported estimates of the ex-
tent of job loss related to NAFTA and imports, and
concluded that NAFTA-import-related job loss ac-
counted for 24 percent–27 percent of manufacturing
job losses over the 1993–99 period. For the economy
overall, NAFTA-import-related job losses are more
modest, accounting for 10.7 percent of the total.
Just from these estimates, we see that import-re-
lated job loss is a sizable share of U.S. manufacturing
job loss and a much smaller share of economy-wide
job loss.12 Although the “trade and jobs” debate will
continue to focus on the numbers of jobs lost, it is
important to note that total employment is essentially
determined by macroeconomic conditions and poli-
cies, both in the U.S. and worldwide. As noted above,
the impact of “trade” is distributional—on where the
jobs are located.
Trade, job loss, and policy
Compared with other Organization for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries,
the U.S. has a modest set of labor market adjustment
programs (primarily unemployment compensation,
training and job search through the Workforce Invest-
ment Act and Trade Adjustment Assistance).13 With
workers bearing most of the burden of labor market
change and flexibility, the fact that the U.S. provides
only modest adjustment assistance programs tends to
heighten anxiety over government policies that might
place (more) workers at risk of job loss. Trade liberaliza-
tion is one example. Historically, Trade Adjustment
Assistance (TAA) has been seen as trade policy, a43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
response to the uneven distribution of benefits and
costs arising from trade, and only secondarily as labor
market adjustment assistance. TAA is provided to workers
displaced by “trade,” while other displaced workers are
eligible for a lesser set of benefits through the Work-
force Investment Act. For policy, it is important to ques-
tion this underlying assumption. Are trade-displaced
workers different from other displaced workers? What
are the characteristics of trade-displaced workers? What
are the labor market consequences of this type of job
loss? I have answered these questions in some detail
in my earlier work. What follows is a summary—Call
these the stylized facts of trade-related job loss.14
On average, the import-competing displaced worker
looks very much like any other displaced manufacturing
worker. However, there is a striking difference in the
degree to which high import-competing industries
displace women, particularly the lower-wage import-
competing industries, which tend to employ large
shares (and often large numbers) of women. Across
apparel, textiles, footwear and leather products, women
accounted for 65 percent–80 percent of workers dis-
placed over the period 1979–2001 and slightly small-
er shares of employment. Observers note that this
gender predominance may occur again as call-centers
and back office processing move to other countries.
As reported in more detail in Kletzer (2001),
compared with displaced non-manufacturing workers,
import-competing displaced workers are older, less
formally educated, notably more tenured, less likely
to be female, more likely to be minority, and far
more likely to be production-oriented.
For many workers, import-competing job loss is
very costly, due to difficulties finding new employ-
ment at a level of pay similar to the old job. Two-thirds
of reemployed workers earn less on their new job
than they did on their old job, and one-quarter expe-
rience earnings losses in excess of 30 percent. The
average earnings loss is more modest, but still sizable
at 13 percent. The distribution of earnings losses is
very similar to that found for all workers displaced
from manufacturing jobs for other reasons.
Import competition is associated with low reem-
ployment rates (on the order of 63 percent for the pe-
riod 1979–2001). The characteristics that limit the
reemployment of import-competing displaced workers
are the same as those that limit the reemployment of all
displaced workers: low educational attainment, advanc-
ing age, high tenure, minority status, and marital sta-
tus. Workers with high tenure and/or low skill levels
may confront serious skill-related adjustment problems,
along with having rusty job search skills. Workers with
these characteristics appear to need the most help.
For most workers, the costs of job loss occur as
reemployment earnings losses. Less formally educated
workers experience the greatest difficulty maintaining
earnings. More generally, reemployment earnings losses
rise with age and job tenure and fall with education.
Reemployment in manufacturing minimizes
earnings losses (on average). An advantageous out-
come for production workers with manufacturing-
specific skills is to stay employed in manufacturing.
Earnings losses are reduced if the worker gets a new
job in an industry similar to the one in which he or
she was previously employed. Reemployment in ser-
vices is associated with the largest earnings losses. There
may be little retraining associated with these moves.
In summary, manufacturing workers are wise to
be anxious about losing jobs and wages. Permanent job
loss is costly for many manufacturing workers. Trade
liberalization is often a flash point for the fear of job
loss, while other factors, notably technological change,
rank ahead of trade as a source of job loss and de-
clining real wages for less-educated workers. Shifts
in international investment, corporate restructuring,
and changes in consumer demand are other sources
of change that affect job security and wages. Two of
these forces, shifts in international investment and (in-
formation) technological change, are coming together
to influence what is being called services outsourcing.
What do we know about services
outsourcing?
Globalization, particularly in the guise of global-
ized production, is evolving and broadening from a
manufacturing base into services. These changes, and
their implications for American workers, have attract-
ed widespread attention. Services now account for a
larger share of global trade than they have in the past.
Trade in services has almost doubled over the past
decade: Over the period 1992 to 2002, service exports
increased from $163 billion to $279 billion and im-
ports grew from $102 billion to $205 billion.
Coincident with the broadening of global economic
integration from manufacturing to services, the face of
job displacement in the United States is changing. While
manufacturing workers have historically accounted
for more than half of displaced workers, in the most
recent downturn non-manufacturing workers accounted
for 70 percent of displaced workers.15 The industrial
and occupational shift in job loss has been associated
with a rise in the probability of job loss for more-ed-
ucated workers.16 For example, the share of job loss-
es accounted for by the finance, insurance, and real
estate, business services, and professional services
sectors, all relatively high-skill industries, more than44 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
doubled from 15 percent during the 1979–82 recession
to 34 percent during the 2000–01 period.
Currently, there is little clear understanding of the
role of services globalization in domestic employment
change and job loss. More fundamentally, there is little
clear understanding of the size and extent of services
global outsourcing, the vulnerabilities of American
workers, and how large this phenomenon is likely to
become in the near term.17
What is known comes from mostly subjective
judgments, though admittedly based on detailed indus-
try knowledge. The most widely quoted projection of
future job losses due to movement of jobs offshore is
Forrester Research’s “3.3 million U.S. services jobs
to go offshore” (McCarthy, 2002). In addition, Deloitte
Research estimates that by 2008 the world’s largest
financial service companies will have relocated up to
two million jobs to low-cost countries; Gartner Research
predicts that by the end of 2004, 10 percent of infor-
mation technology (IT) jobs at U.S. IT companies and
5 percent of IT jobs at non-IT companies will have
moved offshore; another Gartner Research survey re-
vealed that 300 of today’s Fortune 500 companies do
business with Indian IT services companies. Goldman
Sachs estimates that 300,000 to 400,000 services jobs
have moved offshore in the past three years and an-
ticipates a monthly rate of 15,000 to 30,000 jobs,
in manufacturing and services combined, will move
offshore in the future. Bardhan and Kroll (2003) esti-
mate that 14 million workers are vulnerable to job
loss from services outsourcing.
While the size and scope of this activity are not
clear, the changing location of service activities is likely
to affect labor market outcomes of U.S. service sector
workers. Research on this question is barely in its in-
fancy. In preliminary work with J. Bradford Jensen
(Jensen and Kletzer, 2004), I have begun to explore
comparisons between displaced manufacturing workers
and displaced services workers. Very briefly, we are
learning that the incidence of job displacement is notably
lower in services than in manufacturing. Where the
risk of job loss can average 6 percent to 7 percent (an-
nual averages) in manufacturing, for the three services
industries commonly mentioned as vulnerable to off-
shoring (finance, insurance, and real estate; business ser-
vices; and professional services), incidence averages
around 2 percent to 3 percent for the period 1979–2001.
The risk of job loss is trending upward over the period
for services, starting from a relatively low level. The
share of displaced workers accounted for by services
has increased over time, as has the share of employment.
In terms of outcomes, reemployment rates are
higher for displaced services workers than observed
for displaced manufacturing workers. Reemployment
rates average about 70 percent to 75 percent for services
workers, compared with 65 percent in manufacturing.
Reemployment rates fell considerably from the late
1990s to the 2000–01 recession in both services and
manufacturing.
Workers displaced from services are more highly
educated than workers displaced from manufacturing,
with key differences at the lowest and highest ends
of the educational attainment distribution. Relatively
few displaced services workers are high school drop-
outs (ranging from 3 percent to 10 percent), while 30
percent to 40 percent of displaced manufacturing workers
are high school dropouts (depending to some extent
on the industry). Although there is a considerable degree
of variation, for the most part, pre-displacement earn-
ings were higher for services than for manufacturing.
In my manufacturing-based research (Kletzer,
2001), I found a 10 percentage point to 12 percentage
point difference in the likelihood of reemployment be-
tween a high school dropout and a high school graduate.
The reemployment advantages experienced by college
graduates, relative to those without a college degree, are
again seen in services. Mean earnings losses are some-
what smaller from services than from manufacturing,
and a larger share of displaced services workers ex-
perience no earnings loss (or a gain) than we observe
for manufacturing. The shares of workers experiencing
losses in excess of 15 percent are smaller for services,
but still notable, in the range of 25 percent to 30 percent.
Policy implications and conclusions
The notion that trade costs jobs, together with
the notion that trade-related displacement is particular-
ly costly, creates a compelling case for targeted ad-
justment assistance. Neither notion is systematically
true, based on the empirical evidence, but both are
“true enough” to be persuasive and politically influen-
tial. For better or worse, fears of job and earnings losses
associated with “trade” are the hook for reforming la-
bor market adjustment policies. Services outsourcing
and its link to trade present challenges for the current
system of adjustment assistance. Currently, the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) follows a narrow inter-
pretation of TAA eligibility, denying TAA services to
workers displaced from services industries. As discussed
in Kletzer and Rosen (2005), the DOL interpretation
is that workers must prove they lost a job from a firm
that makes a product that is “similar or like an imported
good.” It seems likely that the trend in services out-
sourcing, and any associated job loss, will lead to
pressure on Congress to extend TAA eligibility criteria
to include services workers.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
A common ending for papers in this area is the
(truthful) acknowledgement that free trade, open mar-
kets, economic integration, and dynamic labor markets
can facilitate economic growth and convey benefits.
But change, and open engagement with the world, does
not help everyone. For manufacturing, rising imports
are associated with costly job loss. For services, we sim-
ply do not yet know. That the numbers may be small
or that the association is limited to a particular set of
industries does not diminish the significance of the cost
to those whose jobs and earnings are directly affected.
NOTES
1With apologies to the diversity of views not represented in the
paragraphs above.
2This section borrows heavily from Kletzer (2001, 2004).
3Chapter 5 of Kletzer (2002b) discusses the descriptive and causal
aspects of the question.
4The appropriateness of changes in import share as an operational
measure is highlighted by the language of the Trade Adjustment
Assistance Act, whereby certification for eligibility depends on a de-
termination that increased imports have contributed to displacement.
5The DWS is administered biennially by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics as a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The first survey was administered in January 1984. The 1984–2002
surveys provide coverage of displacements over 1979–2001. In
each survey, adults (aged 20 years and older) in the regular monthly
CPS were asked if they had lost a job in the preceding three- or
five-year period due to “a plant closing, an employer going out of
business, a layoff from which he/she was not recalled, or other
similar reasons.” If the answer was yes, a series of questions followed
concerning the old job and period of joblessness. Other causes of
job loss, such as quits or firings are not considered displacements.
This categorization is consistent with our common understanding
of job displacement: It occurs without personal prejudice in that
terminations are related to the operating decisions of the employer
and are independent of individual job performance. A key advan-
tage of the DWS is its large-scale, representative nature. As part
of the CPS, it draws upon a random sample of 60,000 households,
which is weighted to be representative of the U.S. work force. As
a result, the surveys yield large numbers of displaced workers from
a wide variety of industries.
6Table 1 is an updated and revised version of Table 2.1 in Kletzer
(2001).
7Industries are defined and listed at a three-digit CIC (census in-
dustrial classification) level of detail. For readability, some three-
digit industries are grouped together under more aggregated (or
two-digit) headings.
8My judgments moved several industries into the high-import cat-
egory: Motor vehicles, tires and inner tubes, blast furnaces, other
primary metals, and cycles and miscellaneous transport all have a
history of import competition, are large and visible employers,
but experienced increases in import share just below the top quartile
cutoff.
9See Kletzer (2002b) for a more detailed discussion of manufac-
turing and trade over this period.
10The literature is summarized in Kletzer (2002b).
11This number will be different from the often-cited declines in em-
ployment in manufacturing. Manufacturing employment decline
is a net loss in employment, the difference between employment
gains (through new hires, rehires, and recalls) and reductions in
employment (through quits, layoffs, displacements, retirements,
and deaths). See details in Kletzer (2002b).
12See Scott (2001) for an alternative view on the scale of job loss.
13See Kletzer and Rosen (2005) for a detailed discussion.
14These stylized facts are presented in more detail in Kletzer (2004).
15The shift in job loss from manufacturing and production work-
ers toward service and white-collar (non-production) workers has
been in evidence since the recession of the early 1990s. At that time,
concerns about downsizing and re-engineering were coincident with
a rise in the share of white-collar and service sector job loss (see
Podgursky, 1992, Farber, 1993, Gardner, 1993, and Kletzer, 1998).
16It is still the case that less-educated workers have the highest rates
of job loss overall. In the 2000–01 downturn, workers with a high
school diploma or less accounted for 38 percent of non-manufac-
turing job losses. On average, these low-skilled workers earned
under $20,000 per year in their pre-displacement jobs (estimates
from the Displaced Worker Surveys, 1984–2002).
17The literature on services outsourcing is expanding rapidly.
Recent contributions include: Amiti and Wei (2004); Arora and
Gambardella (2004); Bardhan and Kroll (2003): Bhagwati,
Panagariya, and Srinivasan (2004); Brainard and Litan (2004);
Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004); Samuelson (2004); and
Schultze (2004).46 2Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
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